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Abstract
How do we, humans, communicate with computers, or computational machines? What are the
activities do humans and machines share, what are the meeting points between the two? Eventually,
how can we build concepts of these meeting points that leaves space for the proper mode of existence
of both humans and machines, without subduing one to the other?
Computers are machines that operates on a scale different from humans: the calculus done by
machines is too fast and untangible for humans. This is why computers' activities has to be
textualized, put into a form that can be understand for humans. For instance into a graphical interface,
or a command line. More generally, this article tackles the problem of interface between humans and
machines, the way the relation between humans and machines has been conceptualized. It is inspired
both by philosophy of the modes of existence – since computers are machines with their own mode of
existence – and semiotics, since computers' activities have to be converted in some sort of signs that
can be read by humans.
First, inspired by Gilbert Simondon, we try to understand the mode of existence of computational
machines. By commenting on Turing 1936's seminal article, On Computable Numbers, we show that
computational machines are at their core writing machines. But a writing based on calculus, different
from the human way of writing. Writing can therefore be understood as a meeting point for humans
and machines, provided we give a definition of writing that is large enough to include both humans
and machines. Secondly, we examine theories that deals with the relationship between the two,
mostly english-speaking theorists of interface (Manovich, Galloway) compared to french semiotics of
"les écrits d'écran" ("written writing screens"). We show that both approaches share an
anthropocentric conception of machines and/or writing, making the machine a mere instrument
fulfilling human needs. Eventually, we propose some elements towards a non-anthropocentric
semiotics, by focusing on the notions of interpretation and the spatiality of writing. This non-
anthropocentric semiotics is the first step towards a semiotics that would make room for the mode of
existence of computational machines, enabling us to renew the way we think our relationship to them.
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 I. Introduction 
How does one communicate with computational machines, those technical objects 
that function by means of binary calculations integrated into a piece of electronic 
machinery? How do human beings interact with machines that execute 
instructions inscribed on a surface of less than 100mm2 in a few fractions of a 
microsecond? The problem is that humans do not have a perceptual apparatus 
capable of handling this spatio-temporal scale: we are unable to deal with the 
difference between 0 and 5 volts. However, for the machine, this difference is 
highly significant since it is the basis of the binary code that organises the way it 
stores and handles data. 
For humans and machines to meet, bridges have to be built between their 
different requirements. “Interfaces”, or mediating texts such as source codes and 
“architexts” – to use a term invented by a whole section of French media theory – 
do constitute bridges of a sort. However, these notions tend to mask the technical 
reality of the machines, because they are organized around an anthropocentric 
understanding of writing. Is it not true that “interfaces” give rise to an 
organisation of signs that are meaningful to humans, i.e. texts? Source codes and 
other architexts can be effective at the machine level; but in the final analysis, 
surely their purpose is to produce texts that are readable and meaningful to 
humans? In other words, how can we conceptualize the bridges between humans 
and machines without subordinating the one to the other? How can we make each 
of the two realities exist in itself, which is the pre-condition for exploring the 
possibility of their interrelationship? How can we find common ground, a 
common meeting-point, from which to make the differences between these two 
realities explicit, and what could this meeting-point be? 
We suggest that the common ground might be found in writing. 
Computational machines are in fact writing machines. Not only because they are 
instruments with which human beings can write, but because their own 
functioning depends on a certain kind of writing, writing that does not correspond 
to the same requirements as human writing. The point is that binary writing, 
which obeys the rules of elementary arithmetic and Boolean logic, does not 
conform to the same constraints as the alphabetic writing of humans. In other 
words, the writing of these machines is quite different in nature to the writing of 
humans. We have called the writing of these machines computational writing and 
the writing of humans textual writing. It is important to identify the specificity of 
each of these two kinds of writing in order to understand digital media not only as 
a regime of human meaning, but as a place where humans and machines meet, 
and which we must learn to understand as fundamentally hybrid. This is why we 
are calling for a new kind of non-anthropocentric semiotics, and giving some 
pointers here towards its development. 
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 First, we will try to explain why computational machines can properly be 
understood as writing machines. This will involve developing a concept of 
“writing” that is not anthropocentric, and understanding – like Turing – that these 
machines function based on a form of writing, and how they do so. Our second 
aim will then be to show that the theories that have attempted to conceptualize 
interactions between humans and machines, without the benefit of the notion of 
computational writing, end up by evacuating the computational machines 
themselves from the relationship they are attempting to characterize. Thus, 
theories constructed around the idea of interface, of software, or - in Continental 
theories - the concepts of "screens-as-writing” (écrits d’écran) and “architext” 
(architexte)1, are all based on anthropocentric presuppositions concerning writing 
and thus run the risk of neglecting the activity of the actual machine in the 
implementation of digital media. These theories tend to promote an instrumental 
conception of these machines in which, because they are considered merely as 
means to human ends, they are either relegated to the role of perfect executors of 
programmes written by humans, or else understood as crystallizing human values 
and extensions of power relationships – both symbolic and economic. Our third 
goal is to describe the specificities of the computational writing performed by 
machines, in order to open up the possibility of developing a non-anthropocentric 
type of semiotics that would help to describe the role of computational machines 
in the reality of computerized media in their own terms: in other words, to accept 
that the machines themselves contribute to the culture and the new world that we 
now share with them. 
 
II. Computational machines as writing machines 
The basis for characterizing computational machines as writing machines is an 
article by Alan Turing, On Computable Numbers2. This article is crucial, not only 
because it makes an important contribution to resolving a problem in logic known 
as the Entscheidungsproblem (decision problem), but above all because it is 
without a doubt one of the most important texts in the history of computer 
science. In 1936, Turing produced the theoretical model of what is today called a 
“computer”, a model that was taken up by Von Neumann and his colleagues in 
their First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC3, where they specify the material 
organisation of such a machine: this is the famous “Von Neumann architecture”. 
                                               
1Yves Jeanneret and Emmanuël Souchier, “Pour une poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” Xoana 
6 (1999). 
2 Alan Turing, “On computable numbers, with an application to the 
entscheidungsproblem,” Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42/2 (1936). 
3 John Von Neumann, “First draft of a report on the EDVAC,” IEEE Annals of the 
History of Computing 15/4 (1993 [1945]). 
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 The ideas advanced in Turing’s text are still entirely valid and operational in 
contemporary computer science, which is why this text is truly foundational and 
why it is well worth taking a closer look at it.  
In 1936, Alan Matheson Turing, then a student at King’s College 
Cambridge, wrote an article on the Entscheidungsproblem, a problem in logic that 
was first posed by Hilbert and Ackermann in 1928. In order to answer the 
question, Turing imagined a machine made up of a tape divided into squares and a 
mobile head that would move along a horizontal axis, either to the right or to the 
left of the tape. The head would scan the squares; it would also print, or delete, 
symbols on the current square. According to Turing, this machine would be able 
to solve the axiom of choice problem, since it would calculate anything that is 
algorithmically calculable. 
In his attempt to resolve the Entscheidungsproblem posed by Hilbert and 
Ackermann, Turing begins by explaining that it is first necessary to define what is 
meant by a “calculable number”: it is a number “whose decimal form can be 
written down by a machine”. In Turing’s formulation there is thus a clear 
proximity between writing and calculation. However, it is important to understand 
that this is writing of a very specific kind. For the machine to be able to calculate, 
it must be provided with a tape “analogous to paper”, divided into squares “like a 
child’s arithmetic book”, and on which it can “write down” symbols. These 
symbols are either of the first order, i.e. numbers which in the event are made up 
purely of 0’s and 1’s; or of the second order, for example a letter “A” which can 
replace a given sequence of numbers. The machine can be considered as a 
“calculating machine” when it can manipulate the two orders of symbols, and not 
just first-order symbols. The machine is thus finite because all its operations 
(movements of the head, inscription or deletion of symbols) are determined by its 
internal configurations, which are limited: the behaviour of the machine can thus 
be programmed. But the machine is also finite in the sense that it is entirely 
automatic: it has no need, in order to function, for any external intervention 
(human or other) – provided that the set of all possible configurations has been 
described correctly, i.e. that it has been correctly programmed. 
Nevertheless, although writing and calculating are almost synonymous, it 
is interesting to note that Turing never says that his machine “reads”, nor that it 
“writes”. He explains that the machine scans, and that it can only work on the 
symbol that it is currently scanning: “the scanned symbol is the only one of which 
the machine is, so to speak, ‘directly aware’”4. In other words, the machine has no 
memory. But the machine does “interpret”: for each symbol that it scans, there is 
a precise operation which it must perform. The machine thus acts according to 
                                               
4 Turing, “On Computable Numbers,” 236. 
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 what it has scanned. To “scan” is to detect by moving the reading head along the 
tape, i.e. it is a form of “reading” which is one-dimensional – to the left or to the 
right. Similarly, the machine does not really “write” either; Turing says that it 
“notes” or “writes down” or “prints” symbols. The mathematician structures his 
argument around an analogy between the machine and a human being: “we may 
compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is 
only capable of a finite number of conditions”; “Computing is normally done by 
writing certain symbols on paper. We may suppose that this paper is divided into 
squares like a child’s arithmetic book”5; a tape which is “analogous to paper”. 
But he takes care not to cross the boundary that would attribute human 
behaviour to the machine.  
Rather than contributing to the myth of the human machine, Turing 
contributes instead to a mechanical reduction of the human, but one which is 
provisional. Turing does indeed need to model and formalize human reasoning so 
that calculation can then become automatic. The analogy between the operations 
of humans and those of machines thus tends more towards a limited reduction of 
the human to the mechanical, rather than elevating the machine to the level of 
human intelligence. He does not seek to make the entire range of human 
intellectual operations mechanical, only calculation. It must not be forgotten that 
when he refers to a “computer”, he is not designating the machines that we call 
“computers” today, but rather the human employees whose work consists of 
carrying out various sorts of calculations: statistical, accounting, etc. The Turing 
machine is thus a logical formalization of the task of human calculators. In 
paragraph 9, where he formalizes human reasoning and then evokes the 
possibility of mechanizing it, he ends up by establishing an analogy between these 
very specific intellectual operations performed by humans and mechanical 
operations. Human calculation, he explains, is based on two essential operations. 
Firstly, it consists of the writing of a finite set of symbols on paper, often 
squared6. Secondly, the human calculator then acts according to the symbols that 
s/he sees, but also according to his or her “state of mind” on the spur of the 
moment. While it is possible for the “states of mind” to vary, the number of 
different states of mind that are possible cannot be infinite – otherwise, here 
again, no discrimination would be possible. Secondly, after the system of signs 
come the “elementary operations” of the human calculator: either the writing of a 
new sign on the square currently observed, or else observing a new square – each 
time with or without a change in the state of mind. When human calculation is 
                                               
5 Turing, “On Computable Numbers,” 231. 
6 The symbols must be limited in number, otherwise it may not be possible to tell at 
glance the difference between two inscriptions, for example between 99999999 and 
9999999 
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 formalized in this way, it can then be made automatic:  “We may now construct a 
machine to do the work of this computer”7. At this point, Turing gives the details 
of this automation. It is here that he describes most closely the analogy between 
the human and the machine: to the “state of mind” of the calculator corresponds a 
“configuration” of the reading-head of the machine; to the squares that are 
“observed” by the calculator correspond the squares “scanned” by the machine; to 
the “changes” done by the calculator correspond the “moves” of the machine. 
These mechanical “moves” and human “changes” are always strictly determined, 
respectively by the configuration of the reading-head and by the “state of mind” 
accompanying the square under observation. If we follow Turing, every 
calculation can be brought down to operations of writing symbols, of reading 
(observation or scanning, according to whether the operator is a human or a 
machine), and modifications of states. 
What is at issue in this text is the construction of a relationship between a 
human being and a machine – a relationship built upon writing. To be able to 
conceive his automaton, Turing has to proceed to a mechanical reduction of the 
human. The human-machine relationship is then of the order of an analogy. But 
what is interesting is that once the machine has been conceived and described, the 
relationship is no longer analogical: the human and the machine do not do the 
same things, they are different. The human is not a machine and the machine is 
not a human. It is true that they have something in common, i.e. a certain form of 
writing. This is the place where their relationship is made explicit. But this 
relationship is nevertheless strongly differentiated, in the sense that humans and 
machines do not use the same sort of writing. The writing of humans is of the 
order of what we propose to call textual writing, whereas that of machines is of 
the order of computational writing. 
Before we attempt to characterize these two orders of writing, in what 
sense can we really say that a machine “writes”? To do so, we have to adopt a 
technical conception of writing: “writing”, in this sense, is inscribing signs on a 
substrate. An “inscription” here is to be understood in the sense of a material 
alteration, circumscribed to a specific space and not resulting from chance. An 
“inscription” in this sense does indeed follow a set of rules which prescribe a 
finite set of possible alterations: the French alphabet, for example, or a binary 
language. But inscriptions thus defined are not yet signs; in order to become 
signs, they must: i) designate something other than what they are materially8; and 
                                               
7 Turing, “On Computable Numbers,” 247. 
8 Following the model of Ferdinand de Saussure (Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de 
Linguistique Générale. Paris: Payot, 1916), a sign is made of a signifier and a signified. 
The relationship between the two is arbitrary, meaning there is no direct connection 
between the letter of a word or a picture and what it represents. This relationship is 
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 ii) they must be “read”, i.e. they must be recognized as meaningful alterations and 
interpreted as “referring to something else”. We are indeed dealing with signs 
when, for example, the letter “A” represents a sound in a human language; or 
when an “0” is an electromagnetic alteration which expresses the absence of 
value, or the logical value of “false” when the interpretation is made according to 
the principles of Boolean logic. In order to become a sign, an inscription thus 
requires an act of reading and interpretation. 
This three-part definition of writing as the inscription of signs on a 
substrate is not anthropocentric, in the sense that it does not immediately consider 
writing as the exclusive privilege of humans. It also has the advantage of being 
sufficiently broad to include a wide variety of practices from different historical 
and cultural contexts. For example, the Roman soothsayer, who circumscribed a 
region of the sky in order to observe the trajectories of birds and thereby elucidate 
the favours of the gods, practiced writing; so does the journalist who composes an 
editorial for the upcoming edition of the newspaper for which he works; and the 
same goes for a machine which scans symbols and adjusts its behaviour 
accordingly. 
However, this definition has its drawbacks. It is too general and doesn’t 
take the context of writing into account: it considers a practice (writing) without 
any regard for its social, historical or cultural context. Therefore, it is hard to see 
what might not be considered as a piece of writing. What is certain is that a 
writing practice does not rely exclusively on know-how, on the mastering of a 
specific technique. It also relies on mental representations of writing, and the 
status it has in a given society. The same invention – writing considered as the 
inscription of symbols on a substrate – has very different implications when it is 
used as a memorandum for shamanic incantations in Native American tribes9 or 
when it becomes the central tool for the domination of a social caste in ancient 
Mesopotamia10. The same can be said about writing applied to computers. As 
Annette Vee put it, digital literacy is not only a matter of mastering a certain kind 
                                                                                                                                
based on a convention. If the relationship is arbitrary, this implies that a signifier (for 
instance the letters that form the word “computer”) signifies something different (a 
computational machine) to what it is materially: a string of letters. 
9 Pierre Déléage, Inventer l’écriture. Rituels chamaniques Rituels prophétiques et 
chamaniques des Indiens d’Amérique du Nord, XVIIe-XIXe siècles (Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres, 2013). 
10 Jean-Jacques Glassner, Écrire à Sumer. L’invention du cunéiforme (Paris: Le Seuil, 
2000). 
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 of knowledge, i.e. programming. Literacy is an issue in societies that emphasise 
and value its mastery11. 
But the question of digital literacy, as formulated by Vee, is relevant on 
another level. Programming is writing for the machine, designed to make the 
machine follow instructions. These instructions have to be readable for the 
machine but also for humans. In this case, context is of primary importance and 
programming cannot be reduced to mere instructions to a machine. Recent work 
shows that computer code is not just a set of instructions for a machine. Also 
discernible in computer code are the marks of the context in which it was 
produced12. It obeys a visual rhetoric – indents, layout design, comments, etc. – 
that make it readable for humans13. It is also rooted in professional environments 
and job markets where the economic and symbolic stakes are high14 and which 
influence the way developers write software.  
Our question, however, is different. Our aim is to understand the writing 
of the machine, in other words to find out whether the activity of the machine can 
be qualified as "writing" and what the implications of this would be. By arguing, 
as Turing does, that a computational machine is a writing machine, we are making 
a strategic move. But it is strategic only because we live in a society where 
writing, as well as reading, has great symbolic importance15. Saying that 
something like a computer "writes" is therefore a way of promoting it to the status 
of "those who matter" in the symbolic order of humans. To qualify the activity of 
computational machines as "writing" is to use the symbolic value of writing to 
make room for machines in our contemporary "scriptural economy"16, and 
therefore to lay the grounds for acknowledging these non-human entities not as 
tools or instruments for humans, but as entities with their own way of doing what 
they do. 
                                               
11 Annette Vee, “Understanding Computer Programming as a Literacy,” Literacy in 
Composition Studies 1/2 (2013): 45. 
12 Tania Bucher, “Objects of intense feeling: the case of the Twitter API,” 
Computationnal Culture 3 (Online publication, 2013). Available online: 
http://computationalculture.net/article/objects-of-intense-feeling-the-case-of-the-
twitter-api  
13 Joanna Pomian and Emmanuël Souchier, “Informatique et pratiques écrivantes,” 
Traverses 43 (1988). 
14 Adrian MacKenzie, “The Performativity of code: software and cultures of circulation,” 
Theory, Culture & Society 22/1 (2005). 
15 Roger Chartier, The Order of Books (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
16 Michel De Certeau, L’invention du quotidien. Tome I: Arts de Faire (Paris: Gallimard, 
1990). 
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 For machines to be understood as "writing" machines, we have to provide 
a minimal definition of writing. The above definition fails to address the problem 
of context, but it is of great interest nevertheless, because it allows machines to 
enter the cultural and symbolic order of writing. This is a necessary, though 
insufficient, step towards understanding the polyphony that is consubstantial to 
texts in general and to digital texts in particular. 
To bring our focus back to the machine, it is fully included in this tripartite 
definition of writing. Firstly, it is certainly dealing with a finite set of symbols: the 
first-order symbols consisting of 0’s and 1’s, as well as the second-order symbols 
which are instructions – whether in hexadecimal form or in an assembly language. 
These characters are symbols because they call for an interpretation, in that they 
designate something other than what they are themselves: they are not only the 
decimal form of a computable number, because they lead the machine to adopt 
another state, another “configuration”. Secondly, the "writing" is certainly a form 
of inscription. These symbols are indeed inscribed by the machine itself, which 
has the capacity to note down or to obliterate symbols. Thirdly, these symbols are 
definitely inscribed on a substrate: a hard disk, or the strip of paper in the Turing 
machine. 
To be able to assert that the Turing machine is a writing-machine, we 
therefore have to postulate that writing is an inscribing operation that modifies a 
substrate, and an operation of elementary manipulation of symbols. This 
definition of “writing” is technical – “logistic” as Yves Jeanneret would say when 
he opposes the “material dimension of the circulation of texts” to the semiotic or 
poetic dimension of the interpretation of those texts17. It is technical, and not 
symbolic, which is doubtless the reason why Turing takes care to refrain from 
using the terms of “writing” or “reading” when referring to the activity of his 
machine: the machine neither writes nor reads in the same way as a human being. 
If  we kept the term “writing”, which Turing abstained from doing, this is 
mainly for two reasons. First, keeping the term “writing” to characterize the 
activity of machines makes it possible to avoid excluding them from the realm of 
culture in the name of a human monopoly over the act of interpretation – an 
exclusion which is “the strongest cause of alienation in the contemporary world”, 
according to Simondon. Now such a monopoly is explicitly or implicitly at work 
in a great many studies on communication between humans mediated by 
machines, as is the case for theories that centre on the notions of interface, source 
code, software and architext. These theories are not without interest, but – being 
anthropocentric – they focus exclusively on interpersonal communication between 
                                               
17 Yves Jeanneret, Critique de la trivialité. Les médiations de la communication, enjeu de 
pouvoir (Paris: Non Standard, 2014), 11. 
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 humans via machines, and not on communication between machines or on 
communication between humans and machines. Why? Because they tend to 
evacuate computational activity from the materiality of digital media by 
subordinating it to a scheme which is anthropological and instrumental: 
sometimes these machines are considered purely as a means to human ends, 
sometimes as perfect executors of programmes written by humans, and sometimes 
as crystallizing human values or as extensions of economic and symbolic power 
relationships. In other words, because these theories lack the concept of 
computational writing, they subordinate the computational activities of machines 
to the regime of textual writing – which amounts to denying the existence of 
computational writing. We will make a closer examination of the evacuation of 
machines, first by French media theory, and then by theories that focus on the 
notion of interface. 
 
III. Humans without machines: anthropocentric perspectives on 
writing in digital media theories 
 
French media theory 
The French media theory known as "les écrits d’écran" (“screens-as-writing”)18, 
although it obviously takes an interest in digital media, is not a theory of the 
machine; instead, it posits a type of relationship between humans and machines 
that we shall now question. This theory is indeed centred on writing, but on 
textual writing, and it has therefore helped to spread anthropocentric 
representations of the machine that end up ignoring the machine itself. Our aim is 
not to criticize this anthropocentric view as such, but rather to understand the 
underlying notion of writing that makes this anthropocentric interpretation 
possible. 
The initial concepts of the screens-as-writing theory were developed by 
Yves Jeanneret, Emmanuël Souchier and their colleagues. They were interested in 
the circuits that writing moves through and – in the case of digital media – in what 
made it possible for a text to be displayed before the eyes of a reader. According 
                                               
18 A word-for-word rendering in English of the French term “écrits d’écran” could be 
"writings made by, for and on a screen”. Emmanuël Souchier first coined the term in 
1996 to emphasise the written nature of digital media. It was also a way of 
legitimizing semiotics as a valid method to analyze software, web pages etc., since 
these objects are considered as texts in this theory. Not only are computers based on 
writing, they also produce written objects. This is why we have chosen to translate 
“écrits d’écran” as screens-as-writing. Digital media obviously include a visual and 
pictorial component (the screen, where the interface appears), but they are above all a 
product of writing and allow users themselves to write (“writing”).  
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 to them, screens are also texts, and so there is no reason to oppose screens to 
books: “contemporary writing happens in a new space, which is the screen. It is 
therefore not appropriate to oppose “writing” to “the screen”, as has been done 
too often; on the contrary, the two terms need to be considered in a coherent 
fashion, emphasizing that they henceforth belong to a new stage in the historical 
development of writing: “screens-as-writing”19. If we follow the reasoning of 
these authors, since writing is branching out into a new form of development, 
what is important is to understand what makes it possible to display a text before 
the eyes of the reader. However, the writing which interests them is a form of 
human writing, in the sense that it happens in the socialized space of symbolic 
human exchanges. The point being that, as they are aware of the fact that the 
introduction of computers has broken the “intimate and perennial” relationship 
that unites the sign with its substrate, they consider that it is necessary to employ 
specific tools and procedures to make writing available on a screen. In other 
words, there cannot be text on a screen without having recourse to specific textual 
tools: this is what they call architexts. “We use the term architexts (from archè, 
origin and command) to designate the tools that make the existence of writing on 
the screen possible and which not only represent the structure of the text, but also 
control its execution and production”20. At the heart of their approach, there is 
writing. But it is a human form of writing which, when it is digitized, must 
undergo techno-semiotic mediation in order to exist and to be perceptible by 
human readers. The machine, in these theories, has a dual status. First, it is a black 
box, something that cannot be known without being put into a textual, readable 
form. Secondly, the machine is submitted to an anthropological and instrumental 
scheme. All this stems from the anthropocentric character of writing in the theory 
of screens-as-writing. 
Why can we say that the theory of screens-as-writing turns the machine 
into a “black box”? This stems from the fact that the theory recognizes the split 
brought about by computers between the substrate and the symbol, between what 
is calculated and what is perceptible, and the need to build a bridge “between the 
technology and language”. Mediation is necessary to make the transition 
“between the requirements of the machine and those of social exchange”21 For 
instance, between the data that a user enters by means of the keyboard – the letters 
– and what will appear on the screen, there is a need for several intermediate 
layers to translate between what is legible for a human being and what can be 
                                               
19 Yves Jeanneret and Emmanuël Souchier, “Pour une poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” Xoana 
6 (1999): 97. 
20 Jeanneret and Souchier, “poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” 103. 
21 Emmanuël Souchier and Yves Jeanneret, “Écriture numérique ou médias 
informatisés?,” Pour la Science - Scientific American 33 (2002):102. 
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 manipulated by a machine. To bridge the gap between “the technical memory 
trace which is inaccessible to humans” and “the text displayed on the screen”22, 
and vice-versa, various textual layers are inserted. There is thus a technical 
dimension, the space of the machine, which remains inaccessible to humans and 
thus demands mediation. There is a hidden space, that of calculation, a “black 
box”23 that takes on different forms. It can be for instance an algorithm, where 
“writing which has reached a degree of abstraction such that the senses cannot 
perceive it without intermediaries”, an algorithm “that the eye cannot transcribe in 
perceptible form”24. Each time there is a technical dimension which is absent 
“from the visible scene”25, a space made up of texts “coded by and for the 
machine”26, illegible as such and beyond human understanding. In other words, 
the technical space for calculation cannot be perceived by humans because it is 
organized for the machine. It therefore calls for processes  to put it into symbols 
and meanings that can be grasped by the anthropos – in short, for a form of 
mediation. And this is what is of interest for the theory of screens-as-writing. 
This theory thus proceeds from and produces a certain ignorance of the 
machine, and focuses its attention on the mediating textual levels that make the 
existence of writing on the screen possible: the architexts. It is important to 
analyze these architexts to the extent that they crystallize values as well as various 
socio-economic issues. It is important because, as well as making digital texts 
possible, they control them in the sense that they “format” the writing as a 
“discipline imposed on the ‘writing body", in the sense used by Michel 
Foucault”27. It is therefore important, in the field of screens-as-writing, to develop 
research that focuses on the critical study of forms of domination – symbolic as 
well as economic – in the industrial architexts market. The only thing is that, as 
soon as one enters the field of mediation of technical space, where bridges have 
been built between technology and language, it is no longer a question of the 
machine but only of humans – because these bridges correspond to human criteria 
of understanding and intelligibility, where the issues at stake are human issues. 
And it is these issues that are of interest to the theory of screens-as-writing, when 
it seeks for example to demonstrate the power relationships established with and 
through the architexts that prescribe writing. The screens-as-writing theory is 
focused first and foremost on humans: humans who write to other humans, thus 
                                               
22 Souchier and Jeanneret, “Écriture numérique,” 102. 
23 Souchier, “Écrit d’écran”; Souchier and Jeanneret, “Écriture numérique”; Yves 
Jeanneret, Y’a t-il (vraiment) des technologies de la communication? (Villeneuve 




27 Jeanneret and Souchier, “Poétique de l’écrit d’écran”, 106. 
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 mobilizing – consciously or not – architextual layers. Or else humans, computer 
programmers for example, write to machines and for them; but in fine they do this 
with a view to interactions between humans. Thus, once it has been framed by the 
theorists of screens-as-writing as a "black box", which therefore demands 
mediation, the machine is neutralized – and in two different ways. 
First, it is subservient to the humans who use it. It functions, it executes 
coded programmes, as if it were an extension of the human will – sometimes 
humans who have had to learn how to handle it and to speak to it so that it will do 
what is ordered (i.e. computer programmers), sometimes humans who can purely 
and simply ignore it (users). This neutralization of any action by the machine 
itself, which rests on its subservience to an anthropological and instrumental 
scheme, is in no way surprising to the extent that the “architext” concept was 
formulated precisely in order to deconstruct the rhetoric of interactivity and its 
attribution of a “messianic” dimension to technology28. With their “architext” 
concept, these authors criticize the myth of a “human machine” according to 
which a machine can act in the same way as a human being: “The key question is 
simple: can a tool act in a way equal to that of a human being? The answer is just 
as clear: no, it cannot […] It follows that there is not, and in the proper sense of 
the term there cannot be, any possible interaction between a human being and a 
machine.”29. 
There is no inter-activity between a human and a machine, because the 
machine does not act. If something happens on the screen after the user has 
clicked on an icon, for example, it is not because the Web page itself is 
interactive, it is simply because various upstream architexts have transformed the 
click into a writing gesture that effects the display of a new window or image. The 
interface (the screen) is taken by the semiotics of screens-as-writing only as a 
translation of human acts of writing – acts that are possibly multiple, but 
definitely human. This being so, saying that “the machine ‘acts’ is pure 
rhetoric”30. No, the machine does not act, because action, in the eyes of Yves 
Jeanneret and Emmanuël Souchier, is “a deployment of energy endowed with 
meaning by a subject in a social, historical and cultural context”31. This is – of 
course – something that a machine cannot lay claim to. To adopt their term, the 
machine “functions”, but it does not "act". 
To sum up, the first part of the operation whereby the theory of screens-as-
writing neutralizes the machine involves reducing the machine to a mere 
                                               
28 Jeanneret and Souchier, “Poétique de l’écrit d’écran.” 
29 Jeanneret and Souchier, “Poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” 97-98. 
30 Jeanneret and Souchier, “Poétique de l’écrit d’écran,” 98. 
31 Ibidem. 
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 instrument. And this subordination of the machine to an instrumental scheme 
occurs as a reaction against the idea of a “human machine”. We can recognize 
here one of the attitudes that Simondon, in his introduction to On the mode of 
existence of technical objects, has taught us to spot32. This attitude consists of 
reducing technical objects to mere useful instruments, in order to resist the 
tendency to endow robots with human characteristics –for better or for worse. The 
“better” can, for example, be manifested in the technophile rhetoric of 
“interactivity”. The “worse”, on the other hand, tends to take the form of 
technophobia, which conveys fear of the autonomy of technology. While 
Simondon speaks of the “submission” of technical objects to an instrumental 
scheme as an integral part of  technophobia, the theory of screens-as-writing, with 
its “architext” concept, proceeds to make this reduction as a reaction against 
unconsidered technophilia. The theory of screens-as-writing, because it is based 
on an anthropocentric conception of writing, leads to the neutralization of the 
machine. From this perspective, it is indeed necessary to first “textualize” 
computational operations so that they can be perceived as significant by human 
beings; the machine is then only considered on the basis of its role in 
manipulating meaningless symbols so that they can be displayed on a screen for 
humans. The computational activity is only considered in so far as it makes it 
possible to display writing on the screen. This is not surprising since most of the 
theorists who have adopted the idea of screens-as-writing have a background in 
literary studies, so that their main interest is in the circulation of texts, and thus in 
human criteria of intelligibility and meaning, in their material conditions of 
visibility. If they take an interest in computational activity, it is only because it is 
involved in the material instantiation of contemporary texts. The way that this 
theory enters into the field of digital media, via the context of textual writing, thus 
leads it to doubly neutralise the machine: either the machine is what is 
inaccessible to us humans and something that we can know nothing about; or else 
the machine is something that intervenes in the production of contemporary texts 
and makes it possible to display them on screens. This intervention is of course 
                                               
32 “Our culture thus entertains two contradictory attitudes to technical objects. On the one 
hand, it treats them as pure and simple assemblies of material, that are quite without 
true meaning and that only provide utility. On the other hand, it assumes that these 
objects are also robots, and that they harbour intentions hostile to man, or that they 
represent for man a constant threat of aggression or insurrection. Thinking it best to 
preserve the first character, culture strives to prevent the manifestation of the second, 
and speaks of putting the machines in the service of man, in the belief that reducing it 
it to slavery is a sure means [sic] of  preventing rebellion of any kind.” Georges 
Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Aubier, 1958), 11. 
Translation from the French by Ninian Mellamphy [1980] available at 
https://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/simondon%281%29.pdf. 
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 anything but neutral, because it crystallizes human values and is an extension of 
pre-existing power relationships. In other words, the theory of screens-as-writing 
is interested in textual writing, and that has the consequence of rendering the 
machine interesting only in so far as it makes it possible to display texts on the 
screen, thus subordinating the machine to an anthropocentric scheme of 
usefulness. The concept of architext, which quite rightly deconstructs the 
marketing rhetoric of interaction, makes it possible i) to draw our attention to the 
mediating layers that enable the display of text on the screen; and ii) to textualize 
the technical space of the machine, considered as a black box which is 
inaccessible to the human perceptual apparatus. However, by doing this, it 
neutralizes the existence of the machine in two ways: i) by subordinating the 
functioning of the machine to a purely utilitarian scheme according to which the 
machine does nothing other than crystallize and execute human wishes and logic; 
and ii) by reducing the machine to its role in the production of textual writing, 
thus overlooking the computational writing activity which is specific to 
computational machines. 
The concept of writing, around which the theory of screens-as-writing is 
built, thus tends to obscure the reality of machines. But this theory is not the only 
one to have analyzed digital media and thus established a relationship between 
humans and machines. A second group of theories, centred on the “interface” 




The term “interface” was initially employed in chemistry in the late 19th century, 
to designate “a surface which separates two physically distinct states of matter”. 
Gradually, the interface idea was extended to the digital domain, and then to 
management theory33. In the digital domain, an interface is something that “links 
the software and the hardware with each other, with humans and with other 
sources of data”. In this sense, the “interface concept” does serve to conceptualize 
the articulation between humans and machines, [the machine here being the 
hardware], and it is the main field of study on Human-Machine Interactions 
(HMI). How then do scientists in the human and social sciences, in media studies, 
think of interfaces and what are the effects on the way they consider relationships 
between humans and machines? In order to examine this question, we have to 
start by reviewing some of the central themes of the interface idea: i) its scope 
(can anything be an interface?), ii) its pretensions to invisibility (“the best 
interface is no interface”), and iii) its reinsertion into broader cultural issues. On 
this basis, it becomes possible to show that the theories constructed around the 
                                               
33 Emmanuël Souchier, “Présentation,” Communication & Langages 142/1 (2004): 7. 
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 notion of “interface” nourish, sometimes in a paradoxical way, the instrumental 
conception of technology. Finally, we will tackle the question of developing a 
theory of interfaces that is able to confer an existence to computational machines. 
If we attempt to circumscribe the field in which the “interface” notion can 
apply, the question arises of where the interface actually stops. Is it limited to the 
graphical interface, i.e. the set of icons and menus that allow us to act with digital 
media? Limiting the interface to the graphical interface34, although tempting, is 
doubly problematical. First, it does not take the technical diversity of interfaces 
into account: some interfaces link material components to software components, 
others link programmes with each other (API, or Application Programming 
Interface), etc. Secondly, limiting the interface to the graphical human-machine 
interface amounts to generalizing from the particular. Historically, an interface 
has not always been today's general system of semiotic metaphors that makes it 
possible to manipulate the machine. For example, before GUIs (Graphical User 
Interfaces) came into widespread use, the main means for relating to machines 
was the command line35. But if the interface cannot be reduced to the graphical 
human-machine interface, should it be extended – as suggested by Alexander 
Galloway – to any form of mediation, even to any kind of "go-between" (not only 
a computer screen, but a sheet of paper, a door, etc.)? Is there not a risk of falling 
into the opposite problem of excessive generalization to the point that it becomes 
difficult to define exactly what objects one is dealing with? Galloway's definition 
of the "interface" as a “borderline state”, or “a moment when one meaningful item 
is understood as being distinct from another”36 is actually valid for any threshold 
or indeed for any straight line or material boundary. If the emphasis is on the 
interface as a process (whereby two things are brought into a relationship with 
each other, especially on an interpretative or semiotic level as two “meaningful 
entities”), it can easily be confused with the more general category of mediation. 
After the question of circumscribing it, a second difficulty with the 
"interface" notion stems from the question of its visibility. By “visibility” is 
meant: does the user realize that mediation is necessary to allow the use of a 
computer or a smartphone? Is there any friction, or “resistance” between the 
user’s intentions and the machine? When formulated in this way, the question of 
visibility is very close to that of the “transparency” of interfaces and their intuitive 
nature. Now these are actually tricky questions when one addresses issues of 
ergonomics or interface design. The dominant trend in contemporary design 
studies holds that a good interface is one that the user is not aware of, whose 
                                               
34 Matthew Fuller et al., Software Studies: A Lexicon (Boston: MIT Press, 2008), 149. 
35 Neal Stephenson, In the Beginning was the command line (online publication, 1999). 
Available online at http://www.cryptonomicon.com/beginning.html. 
36 Alexander Galloway, The Interface Effect (New-York: Politis Press, 2012), 33. 
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 mediating and framing action is not obtrusive37: “the best interface is no 
interface”. This comes back to the dynamics of “immediacy” investigated by Jay 
Bolter and Richard Grusin38, according to which the aim of any kind of mediation 
is to remain in the background in order to keep the focus on what is to be 
mediated, in this case the tasks that humans want the machines to do. 
The problem is that this invisibility, this apparent “seamlessness”, can 
make it difficult to achieve a critical understanding of interfaces, since the fact of 
considering that they are invisible amounts to blinding oneself to their power of 
configuration39. The role of the semiotician, and more generally of any human 
scientist who properly fulfils their critical function, thus demands that they do not 
accept the “intuitive” or “transparent” nature of the interfaces in question at face 
value, but seek on the contrary to understand the operations through which these 
interfaces are rendered “intuitive”. In this sense, there is always a certain 
“density” to interfaces: they are the fruit of work and study (interface design), 
they are a composition of signs (the “trash-bin”, the “file”, the “page”) that call 
upon the memory of certain social practices or specific professional contexts. 
These signs propose a certain model of the relationship with the machine. Now, 
once an interface is massively adopted and industrially reproduced, this specific 
model becomes dominant ipso facto. Describing an interface as “neutral” or 
“invisible” prevents a proper appreciation of its influence and its cultural effects, 
since its political and potentially problematic significance is evacuated under 
cover of purely ergonomic considerations. 
Some work has already been done with a view to taking this cultural 
dimension of interfaces seriously. This is in fact central to two important theories 
in the field of media studies: in the USA, the theories of Lev Manovich on the 
new media; in France, the semiotics of screens-as-writing with Emmanuël 
Souchier and Yves Jeanneret. Lev Manovich, in The Language of New Media40, 
devotes a whole chapter to the interface notion. According to him, an interface is 
a sort of converter, a “code that conveys cultural messages in a variety of 
media”41. This encoding is not a simple transposition, but a translation, indeed a 
trans-formation: there is no “transparency of the code”. Manovich places himself 
in the realm opened up by the work of McLuhan, where media not only relay 
messages, but also transform them. An interface thus has real density. It 
                                               
37 Timo Arnall, Making Visible (Oslo: Oslo School of Architecture and Design, 2014), 
53. 
38 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).  
39 Arnall, Making Visible, 53; Souchier, “Présentation,” 7. 
40 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). 
41 Manovich, Language, 76. 
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 effectively modifies the perceptions of the user: "the interface shapes how the 
computer user conceives the computer itself. It also determines how users think of 
any media object accessed via a computer”42. The point is that the computer of the 
new millennium is no longer merely a tool for calculating but a “universal media 
machine”43; the “interface” is then no longer a simple means of entering into a 
relationship with a machine, but a new way of envisaging media forms. This new 
technology reconfigures existing cultural practices: reading, listening to music, 
etc. Manovich explains: “we are no longer interfacing with a computer but with 
culture encoded in digital form”44. For this reason, Manovich referred to “cultural 
interfaces” rather than just “interfaces”: the way in which we think of media, and 
cultural practices more generally (reading, writing, viewing, etc) is shaped in part 
by the digital media themselves. The “interface”, for Manovich, thus designates a 
much broader phenomenon than computers as such: by virtue of its deployment in 
digital media, the interface has become our main way of understanding the world. 
By highlighting certain characteristics of these new media, of their “language”, 
Manovich hopes to identify certain aspects of this “interfaced” relationship with 
the world. 
The French theory of screens-as-writing  does in a way fit in with this 
analysis of the interface as embedded in the dense dimension of culture. However, 
since this theory is rooted in semiotics, it gives particular attention to the signs 
that make up the screens; this leads to analyses that are more restricted and local 
than those of Manovich, which are broader in scope. According to Souchier and 
Jeanneret, the interface (of an item of software, a Web site for example) plays a 
cultural role since, as an “architext”, it “crystallizes”45 values and representations 
that will affect the activities it makes possible. In the architexts can be read a 
“fixation of typical uses”, in particular by way of the signs that compose the 
graphical interface. This being so, a semiotic analysis of the historical and cultural 
circulation of these signs (for example, the icon of the disk that indicates the 
“save" function) makes it possible to demonstrate the cultural density of an 
interface. However, although the theory of screens-as-writing – like Manovich's 
theory – does make it possible to conceptualize the mediating and communicative 
function of interfaces, it is still true that a machine is never thought of as having 
the capacity to act on its own. If screens crystallize the logic of the humans who 
                                               
42 Ibidem. 
43 Manovich, Language, 80. 
44 Ibidem. 
45 Emmanuël Souchier, “Lorsque les écrits de réseaux cristallisent la mémoire des outils, 
des des médias et des pratiques,” in Les défis de la publication sur le Web: 
hyperlectures, cybertextes et méta-éditions, ed. Jean-Michel Salaün et Christian 
Vandendorpe (Lyon: Presses de l’ENSSIB, 2004). 
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 were involved in their construction (designers, engineers, etc.), if architexts frame 
the act of writing according to models chosen by the developers and the software 
editors, the graphical interface is portrayed as a sedimentation of professional 
practices and human values. We thus find ourselves in a situation where there are 
no longer any machines, only humans who enter into relationships with other 
humans. The interface becomes a means whereby certain humans propose or 
impose certain conceptions of writing on other humans. 
In other words, in these theories the machine is reduced to a purely 
instrumental scheme. This tendency was noted, and criticized, by Wendy Chun46 
in her work on source code. Her argument is as follows: source-code is too often 
considered as “automatically self-executable”, as allowing the display of a 
graphical interface or the execution of software by virtue of its syntax alone. It is 
presented as the “self-evident ground or source of our interfaces”47, which is the 
result of human writing: that of the software developer giving instructions to a 
machine that does nothing other than execute them perfectly. Whenever the 
interface is considered as the result of a source-code, i.e. the set of instructions 
given to a machine by a human being, then any analysis of interfaces eventually 
results in an analysis of strictly human aims. Thus the theory of screens-as-
writing, in seeking to emphasize the importance of technical mediation via the 
idea of crystallization, ends up promoting an anthropological and instrumental 
view of the machine according to which the interface is nothing but the result of 
human intentions. Now, although it is true that these intentions are realized by a 
machine via a source code, what appears on the screen is not a simple 
transposition of what the developers ordered the machine to do: there is a real 
discrepancy between the code and the interface, and this is because the machine 
itself acts. What is at stake, then, is laying the foundations for a theory that would 
give its proper place to the activity of the machine itself, and thus allow this 
activity to exist and to be characterized. 
In order to do this, we need to consider the interface not as the product of 
human will alone, but rather as a hybrid (via a code) of human instructions on the 
one hand, and execution by the machine which is not controlled entirely by prior 
coding. The outlines of an approach of this sort can be found in the pioneering 
studies of Brenda Laurel who, back in the 1980s, described digital interfaces as 
“theatres”48. According to Laurel, an interface is a stage. It provides a “shared 
                                               
46 Wendy Chun, “On ‘Sourcery’, or Code as Fetish,” Configurations 16/3 (2008). 
47 Chun, “Sourcery”, 309. 
48 Brenda Laurel, “Interface as Mimesis,” in User Centered System Design: New 
Perspectives on Human-Computer Interaction, ed. Donald A. Norman. and Stephen 
W. Draper (New-Jersey: Lawrence Elbaum Associates, 1986); Brenda Laurel, 
Computers as theatre (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1991).  
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 context for action in which humans and machines are agents”49. The source code 
is to be understood as a script, or the text of a play, as “a set of instructions that 
defines the potential actions to be performed by people and computers working 
together”50. Considering the interface in terms of a stage makes it possible to 
understand it not simply as the result of a programme written by humans, but as a 
space where humans and machines can meet. According to Laurel, the machine 
can be considered as an active agent; however the details of these actions are not 
fleshed out. We are left only with the metaphor of the theatre: an entity “acts” to 
the extent that it participates in the unfolding of an action. Nevertheless, the work 
of Laurel can inspire a non-anthropocentric approach to digital media, making it 
possible to consider that computational machines do act. “Interfaces” thus become 
spaces where humans and non-humans can enter into a relationship: they are the 
results of a complex interweaving of writings and objects (operating system, size 
and resolution of the screen, version of the search engine, quality of the material 
employed, etc.); they depend on both computational operations and human 
instructions, with none of the participating entities being subservient to the actions 
of the others. A semiotic analysis giving close attention to the activity of both 
humans and machines can thus be deployed to bring out the cohabitation of these 
two entities – rather than seeing only the human intentions “behind” the 
interfaces. 
The concepts of architext and interface both deal with the way humans 
interact with machines. But the effect of their respective anthropocentric 
presuppositions is that, only too often, they are actually questioning how human 
beings interact with other human beings, the mediation by the machine being 
reduced to a purely instrumental role. Whether in the ideal of a “transparent” 
interface, which fades into the background to make way for the desiderata of the 
user, or in the conception of an architext which is supposed to be the technical 
crystallization of power relationships between humans, technical mediation in 
both cases takes second place. It counts either as a necessary evil which is best 
forgotten (the invisible interface), or as the substrate underlying the conduct of 
human affairs (architext). 
This conception of technology has consequences for the status of the signs 
that appear on the screen. If, for any writing on a screen, it is valid to distinguish 
the semiotic layer (the symbols to be read by humans) from the technical layer 
(the operations of the machine which make it possible to display the semiotic 
layer), anthropocentric perspectives on technology most often reduce the latter to 
the former. Thus, if the machine is considered as a pure instrument, it is 
understood as producing “text” in the human sense of the term. In other words, it 
                                               
49 Laurel, Computers, 4. 
50 Laurel, Computers, 45. 
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 is an instrument capable of participating in “graphic reasoning”51, which is based 
on the bi-dimensional nature of writing, on the spatial co-presence of meaningful 
items, and whose structural concepts are the list, the table and the formula. 
However, if the machine is indeed itself engaged in a process of writing – as it is 
possible to maintain according to Turing – it is a form of writing which is not a 
matter of texts but rather of calculation. And it is precisely this form of 
computational writing that is obliterated by the notions of interface or architext, 
because the latter focus exclusively on textual writing. What is at issue is 
therefore to develop concepts that would allow us to analyze writing on a screen 
while also considering the computational writing of the machine itself.   
 
IV. How do machines write on electric screens? The need for non-
anthropocentric semiotics 
The first possibility would be to understand the interface not as solely the result of 
a source-code, and therefore entirely subordinate to human will, but rather as a 
"Place of the Third Kind", i.e. a space for shared action by the machine and the 
human, and which does not belong exclusively to either of them. In this sense, the 
interface is no longer understood as determined upstream by digital code written 
by humans, but rather as the constantly dynamic result of interactions between 
humans and machines. If, for example, a user re-dimensions a window, or clicks 
on an icon to open a second window, s/he will see on the screen the result of the 
combination of his or her actions with the way in which the machine adapts to the 
situation and participates in it. If some of these adaptations can certainly be 
written in advance, for instance when the site or the application adapts the size of 
the type to the size of the window (on the responsive design principle), they also 
depend on the machine which executes the code: the result will not be the same if 
the computational activity is performed by a computer or by a smartphone. This 
idea of the interface as a place "of the third kind" turns it into a space that results 
from a combination of writing by humans and writing by machines. It is therefore 
not only a process, but a hybrid process in which the machine participates fully, 
and in which it is not a mere instrument but has a certain power of agency: it 
writes. 
However, if writing is an activity which is common to humans and 
machines, and if the two can meet in interfaces, it is important to recognize not 
only that the machine writes, reads and interprets, but that it does not do so in the 
same way as humans. If, to follow Turing, it is possible to show in what sense 
computational machines are writing machines, it should also be noted that Turing 
identified two areas in which machines and humans differ: the tabular nature of 
                                               
51 Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977). 
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 writing, and interpretation. The “tabularity” of writing52 corresponds to the spatial 
dimension, which is usually two-dimensional, of any text. A human writes from 
top to bottom, from bottom upwards, from left to right, in boustrophedon 
(alternately left-to-right and right-to-left), etc.; whatever the substrate, human 
writing is a practice which is deployed in two dimensions. In contrast, the Turing 
machine writes in only a single dimension. It follows the paper tape, moving only 
from left to right, from one square to the next. As Turing himself wrote, “in 
elementary arithmetic, the two-dimensional character of the paper is sometimes 
used. But such a use is always avoidable, and I think that it will be agreed that the 
two-dimensional character of paper is not essential to computation”53. Thus, even 
if Turing defines calculation as a form of writing, bi-dimensionality is purely 
incidental. 
Then there is the question of interpretation: machines do not just execute, 
they also interpret, but they interpret in a quite different way to humans. Machines 
interpret because they read symbols (0’s and 1’s, or second-order symbols such as 
alphabetic characters), and this activity triggers a movement on their part and a 
modification of their internal state with no need for human intervention (unless 
there is an abnormal breakdown), since these machines are automatic. However, 
this machine-like interpretation can only occur on condition that the symbols are 
not ambiguous, and that they have been explicitly foreseen in the list of all 
possible states of the machine. The symbols must be rigorously monosemous, one 
might say, whereas in classical semiotic theory, interpretation is linked to 
polysemy, an openness to multiple possible meanings of a text according to the 
reader. And it is precisely this openness that guarantees the value of reading as the 
actualization of one of the potential meanings of the text. It is clearly not under 
these conditions that a machine “reads” or “interprets”. 
By showing that computational machines are writing machines, but that 
their writing is computational and not textual, the idea is to open up the possibility 
of developing a non-anthropocentric kind of semiotics that seeks, in these places 
"of the third kind" that are interfaces, to avoid making computational writing 
systematically subservient to textual writing – or invisible. 
When distinguishing computational writing from textual writing, while 
considering the former as subservient to the latter, the point is not to create an 
opposition between the two. Both types of writing are in constant interaction in 
interfaces, given the fact that interfaces are texts and that every text is 
                                               
52 Christian Vandendorpe, Du Papyrus à l’Hypertexte. Essai sur les mutations du livre et 
de la lecture (Paris: La Découverte, 1999), 39-68. 
53 Turing, “Computable Numbers”, 245. 
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 polyphonic54. A text organizes, through graphical means, a situation of 
communication, and therefore the cohabitation between the entities involved in 
the situation. For instance, in every text there is a way of representing the author, 
the reader and the tool that was used in the writing, and all of these are visible 
through editorial utterance55 (“énonciation éditoriale”). In this sense, a text is not 
a requisition of pre-made entities, of “building blocks” such as Author, Reader 
and Tool. Rather, it is a pattern of relationships that can best be described in 
ecological terms56. As such, an interface is ecological, because it organizes a 
particular relationship between computational and textual writing. 
But thinking in ecological terms does not prevent us from distinguishing 
different entities and different activities in a way that allows each participant in 
the situation to express itself according to its own mode of expression. Neither 
does it prevent us from analyzing the ideology that tends to threaten the 
ecological diversity of a text by promoting the idea that the text is the product of a 
single author. This is the hypothesis, formulated by Michel de Certeau, of the 
“scriptural economy”57, where writing has been one of the main ideologies since 
modern times. To de Certeau, writing in our society is a “myth”: it is an activity 
that promotes, through the figure of the “author” for instance, a human individual 
as his or her own master, capable of organizing the world according to their own 
will on the blank space of the page. Writing, to de Certeau, is an ideological 
operation that tends to deny the polyphony of each text. Our argument is therefore 
on this ideological (or “mythical”) level. Of course, most artists, developers or 
academics acknowledge the computational part of digital texts. But these are 
practices that make sense as “artistic” or “innovative” precisely because they 
differ from a norm, they challenge the ideology of writing as a myth and of the 
computer as a mere instrument. 
The computational writing theory we propose is a conceptual tool that 
allows this ideology to be challenged as well. It aims to bring semiotics, as a 
discipline that analyzes texts, into the toolbox to shed a new light on the non-
human dimension of every digital text and thus to contribute to new thinking on 
the polyphony of these texts. 
But what might be the concrete objects of non-anthropocentric semiotics? 
What precisely is there to be observed? Are not the signs indicating the 
                                               
54 Mikhaïl Bakhtine, Le Principe Dialogique. Edited by Tzvetan Todorov (Paris: Le 
Seuil, 1981). 
55 Emmanuël Souchier, “L’image du texte. Pour une théorie de l’énonciation éditoriale,” 
Cahiers de Médiologie 6 (1998): 137-145. 
56 Jenny Edbauer, “Unframing models of public distribution: From rhetorical situation to 
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 computational activity of the machine always retranslated into human language? 
For example, the indication displayed on every page of Google results - “X results 
in Y seconds” - is certainly a way of putting the activity of the machine into 
meaningful symbols, but it is centred on the human side to the point where the 
activity of the machine is subordinate to an anthropological scheme58. In other 
words, the cultural and ideological weight of understanding the interface as text is 
so powerful that it may be well nigh impossible to find any signs of computational 
writing that are not already textual writing. Except, perhaps, by taking an interest 
in outlying activities: not only artistic practices – which care less about the 
intelligibility of the text produced for humans than about the potential for the 
expression of the machine – but also all the occasions when the interface goes 
haywire. Taking an interest in those moments when, in the midst of textual 
writing, forms of computational writing suddenly invade the screen. This 
happens, for instance, when there is a "bug" in the display, when a video cannot 
be read because a plug-in is out of date, or when the CSS59 of a site does not 
properly upload so that the text looks disorganized and anarchic on the page. But 
it is also the case with glitches on Google Earth60, for example. These glitches 
clearly demonstrate the mechanical composition of every interface, a composition 
that is often denied by the dominant anthropocentrism that will tend to disqualify 
these events as "bugs". But they are only “bugs” if we consider technical objects 
from the anthropological and instrumental perspective : in the examples we have 
mentioned, the machine is not making any mistakes, it is doing its job. It is 
calculating and giving a graphical account of its calculations in accordance with 
the information it has at its disposal. A “bug” is only a “failure” by virtue of the 
ideology of the computer as a tool serving humans. The concrete objects of the 
non-anthropocentric semiotics that we call for are perhaps somewhat limited, but 
the fact remains that this kind of semiotics would make it possible to investigate 
the omissions of current semiotics in analyzing our relationships with 
computational machines, in the hope of making things happen and seeing new 
fields of research appear.  
                                               
58 Cléo Collomb and Samuel Goyet, “Meeting the machine halfway: towards a semio-
political approach of computational action” (paper presented at the Reconfiguring 
Human and Non-Humans: text, images and beyond symposium, University of 
Jyväskyllä, Finland, 29-30 October 2015). 
59 Cascading Style Sheet. A CSS is a language that describes the style of a document, 
most often a web page. The content of the document is usually described in a HTML 
document, although some of the graphical aspect of the text can be written in HTML. 
60 Collomb and Goyet, “Meeting the machine halfway”, 2015. 
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